Power, rail and communications networks cover large territories and contain equipment that can take months or years to replace. Detecting a flying object is not the same as proving hostile intent.

A dispersed threat

France created a framework in August allowing selected vital operators to disable or neutralise drones under defined threat conditions. Poland has gone further around some energy sites, while Germany is still reviewing possible private-sector involvement.

France created a framework in August allowing selected vital operators to disable or neutralise drones under defined threat conditions. Poland has gone further around some energy sites, while Germany is still reviewing possible private-sector involvement.

France created a framework in August allowing selected vital operators to disable or neutralise drones under defined threat conditions. Poland has gone further around some energy sites, while Germany is still reviewing possible private-sector involvement.

Technology cannot decide liability

Modern systems combine sensors, classification software and countermeasures, but automation cannot settle responsibility. A misidentified authorised aircraft or falling drone can create a second emergency. Decisions must be documented, proportionate to the location and tied to an accountable authority.

Modern systems combine sensors, classification software and countermeasures, but automation cannot settle responsibility. A misidentified authorised aircraft or falling drone can create a second emergency. Decisions must be documented, proportionate to the location and tied to an accountable authority.

Protect services without creating another risk

Utilities have traditionally invested in resilience and restoration. Counter-drone protection adds prevention, but cannot guarantee that every incident will be stopped. Europe’s success should be measured by safe service continuity, not by the number of objects brought down.

Utilities have traditionally invested in resilience and restoration. Counter-drone protection adds prevention, but cannot guarantee that every incident will be stopped. Europe’s success should be measured by safe service continuity, not by the number of objects brought down.

Conclusion

Utilities have traditionally invested in resilience and restoration. Counter-drone protection adds prevention, but cannot guarantee that every incident will be stopped. Europe’s success should be measured by safe service continuity, not by the number of objects brought down.